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Crime Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal
Forfeiture in Perspective
Edward C. Weiner*
Mr. Weiner examines the history of criminal forfeiture, the
legislative history, judicial interpretation, and the procedural
steps leading to forfeiture under RICO in order to provide a
clearer understandingof this novel statute.
INTRODUCTION

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute1
(RICO) has been the law of the land for a little more than ten
years. It is a powerful federal statute passed by Congress to provide strong remedies intended to deal with the national problem of
corrupt criminal organizations and the infiltration of organized
crime into legitimate businesses. It appears as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.' In addition to the sanctions of
a $25,000 fine and a maximum of twenty years imprisonment,
RICO includes the remedy of criminal forfeiture, an in personam
device to bring about the transfer of the defendant's property in* Mr. Weiner is Deputy Director, Office of Economic Crime Enforcement,

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1967, J.D., 1970,
University of California, Los Angeles; Former Attorney-in-Charge, Washington,
D.C. Organized Crime and Racketeering Strike Force. Between 1974 and 1980 Mr.
Weiner was responsible for reviewing most of the 300 cases submitted to the
United States Department of Justice under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Statute (RICO). Former Deputy District Attorney, Bakersfield,
California (1971-73). The views expressed in this article are solely those of the
author. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance of Kathleen
M. Smith, third-year student at Northern Illinois University College of Law.
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et
seq. (1970). See generally, G. BLAKEY, TECHNIQUES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME: MATERIALS ON RICO (1980); Bradley, Racketeers, Congressand the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837 (1980);
Note, RICO, Are the Courts Construing the Legislative History Rather Than the
Statute Itself?, 55 NOTRE DAME L. 777 (1980); Note, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act: An Analysis of its Application and a Proposal for
Reform, 33 VAND. L. REV. 441 (1980); Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the
Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 165 (1980).
2. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941.
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terest to the United States government following conviction.' This
unique sanction was rarely used in American jurisprudence prior to
RICO's enactment.
Because of the absence of a statutory definition of "organized
crime"" in the Organized Crime Control Act and the inclusion in
the RICO definitional section' of "racketeering activity" of such
traditional white collar crimes as bribery, mail fraud, wire fraud,
bankruptcy fraud and securities fraud, a broadened approach to
RICO has been successfully used by the government in criminal
prosecutions of white collar offenders.' RICO is viewed not only as
an effective tool to halt the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business, but also as a powerful tool to wage war on white
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970).
4. A good working definition of organized crime is the one formulated by the
National Organized Crime Planning Council, an advisory group of agencies
chaired by the United States Department of Justice. Its definition:
"Organized Crime" refers to those self-perpetuating, structured and disciplined associations of individuals or groups, combined together for the
purpose of obtaining monetary or commercial gains or profits, wholly or
in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a
pattern of graft and corruption.
Organized crime groups possess certain characteristics which include
but are not limited to the following.
A) Their illegal activities are conspiratorial;
B) In at least part of their activities, they commit or threaten to
commit acts of violence or other acts which are likely to intimidate;
C) They conduct their activities in a methodical, systematic, or
highly disciplined and secret fashion;
D) They insulate their leadership from direct involvement in illegal activities by their intricate organizational structure;
E) They attempt to gain influence in Government, politics, and
commerce through corruption, graft, and legitimate means;
F) They have economic gain as their primary goal not only from
patently illegal enterprises such as drugs, gambling and loansharking, but also from such activities as laundering illegal money
through and investment in legitimate business.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)-(10) (1970).
6. One of the statute's principal proponents, Representative Poff of the
House Judiciary Committee, seemed to blur any real distinction between organized crime and white collar crime. He stated:
[O]rganized crime within the intendment of the bill. . . is a functional
or sociological concept like white collar or street crime, serving simply as
a shorthand method of referring to a large and varying group of individual criminal offenses committed in diverse circumstances.
116 CONG. REc. 35,344 (1970) (Remarks of Rep. Poff). See also, 116 CONG. REc.
18,913, 18,940 (1970) (Remarks of Sen. McClellan).
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collar crime. In United States v. Elliott,8 the Fifth Circuit favored
this plain language approach to statutory interpretation:

[W]e do not believe that it is normally a proper judicial function
to try to cabin in the plain language of a statute, even a criminal
statute, by limiting its coverage to the primary activity Congress
had in mind when it acted.' (Emphasis in original).
Although RICO was passed in 1970, the criminal forfeiture
provisions of the statute were not utilized extensively and were not
examined by the federal courts until quite recently. 0 The Supreme
Court has heard and decided a RICO case after denying many petitions for certiorari." Although there have been few forfeitures"
under the statute, criminal forfeiture has come under attack by at
7. A good working definition of white collar crime is "an illegal act or series
of illegal acts committed by non-physical means and by concealment or guile, to
obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or
to obtain business or personal advantage." H. EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT,
AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME, 3

(1970). The House Subcommittee on

Crime has adopted this definition of white collar crime. The Justice System Administrative Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 96-157, §901(a)(18), - Stat. (1979). See Conyers, Corporateand White Collar Crime: A View by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 287, n.1 (1980).
Representative Conyers stated that official estimates of the total cost to the
American public of white collar crimes is from 40 to 200 billion dollars. Id. at 297.
8. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Delph v. United States,
439 U.S. 953 (1978).
9. 571 F.2d at 897, n.1. Contra, Merz, The Meaninglessness of the Plain
Meaning Rule, 4 U. DAYTON L. Rv. 31 (1979).
10. See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445
U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir.
1980); United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 101 S.
Ct. 104 (1980). Early RICO cases established the constitutionality of the statute.
See United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1165 (1975) and United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
11. United States v. Turkette, Docket No. 80-808 (Decided June 17, 1981)
reversing 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), held that "enterprise" includes a series of
criminal acts unrelated to a legitimate business operation.
12. Some RICO indictments have resulted in plea bargains where criminal
forfeiture was bargained out of the case. Some cases have alleged forfeiture, but
after the passage of time between investigation and trial, there were simply no
assets left to forfeit. Many RICO cases have been corruption cases or cases where
an illegitimate "group of individuals associated in fact" enterprise would not trigger criminal forfeiture. A few cases where forfeiture was viable were not followed
to their logical conclusion because of a reluctant judge or unwilling prosecutor.
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least one commentator.' s The prosecutorial view is that forfeiture
13. Taylor, Forfeiture Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 - Rico's Most Powerful
Weapon, 17 AM. CraM. L. REV. 379 (1980). See also, Tarlow, RICO: The New
Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165 (1980). The author
offers a thorough analysis of RICO in its entirety from a criminal defense standpoint. While it is not possible to respond to Mr. Tarlow's article in kind, there are
crucial points of difference in his analysis of RICO as contained herein:
1) Definitional Differences
Mr. Tarlow states, "Most defendants charged with violating RICO
could not conceivably be included in the traditional or newly expanded
definitions of organized crime." 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 170. Since individuals cannot be convicted of a status crime, i.e., membership in an organized crime syndicate, RICO's definitional sections of the substantive
offense require commission of two or more crimes which form a pattern
of racketeering activity. The crimes themselves include white collar
crimes, with the result that the RICO net may indeed catch the ordinary
white collar criminal who has no connection to an organized crime syndicate. It is necessary, however, that the RICO definitions be that broad
because RICO is concerned with the infiltration and commission of crime
into the corporate arena with the resultant harm on the American economy. It would be impossible to attack the infiltration of organized crime
into legitimate businesses and the commission of economic crime without
also attacking the white collar crimes used as a means of infiltration and
control. See notes 4-9 and accompanying text infra.
2) Mandatory Forfeitures
The position of the court in United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796,
809-14 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 104 (1980) that a trial court has
no discretion to overturn the jury's determination on criminal forfeiture
and to grant remission or mitigation is correct. Section 1963(c) states
that all provisions of the customs laws dealing with forfeitures are applicable to RICO forfeitures "insofar as applicable and not inconsistent."
Under the customs law, a decision as to remission or mitigation of forfeiture is solely within the power of the Executive Branch. See notes 106108 and accompanying text infra.
3) Procedural Due Process Considerations
In his concern for the rights of innocent parties in the property ordered forfeited, Mr. Tarlow minimizes the importance of specific procedural changes in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These changes
were promulgated in 1972 to alleviate any due process problems in the
criminal forfeiture area. The changes include Rule 7(c)(2), giving specific
notice, Rule 31(e), which provides that the jury shall return a special
verdict on the extent of the interest subject to forfeiture, and Rule
32(b)(2), which states that a judgment of criminal forfeiture authorizes
the Attorney General to seize the property and fix "such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper." See notes 86-89 and 103-08 and
accompanying text infra. There will be no effect on innocent persons if
the forfeiture paragraph of the indictment is directed only against the
defendant's interest. See notes 122-127 and accompanying text infra.
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is a proper and well-aimed tool to undertake a widespread attack
on the criminal element which corrupts our economic system. A
thorough comprehension of the history of criminal forfeiture, its
intended function as seen in the legislative history, judicial interpretation of the forfeiture language, and the procedural steps leading to forfeiture will assist in the better understanding and utilization of this novel statute.
I.

A.

HiSToRIcAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

British Practices

Under the English common law, criminal forfeiture was a typical punishment for those convicted of felonies or treason. The convicted felon forfeited his goods and chattels to the Crown, while
his lands escheated to his lord. The convicted traitor forfeited all
of his property, both personal and real, to the Crown.1 The British
legal scholar, Blackstone, offered the following rationale for criminal forfeiture:
[H]e who hath thus violated the fundamental principles of govermnent, and broke his part of the original contract between king
and people, hath abandoned his connection with society; and hath
no longer any right to those advantages, which before belong to
him purely as a member of the community; among which social
advantages the right of transferring or transmitting property to
others is one of the chief. Such forfeitures, moreover, whereby his
posterity must suffer as well as himself, will help to restrain a
man, not only by the sense of his duty, and dread of personal
punishment, but also by his passions and natural affections. 16
Slightly different rules and procedures were applicable to personal property vis-A-vis real property. The forfeiture of personalty
did not date back to the time of the offense, while forfeiture of
realty did.' This was primarily because of the ease with which per4) Forfeiture of Profits
Income derived from violations of Section 1962 is properly subject to

forfeiture under the express statutory language and its legislative history.
See notes 58-65 and related text infra.
14. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14 (1827).
15. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENrARIS* 349 (New ed. 1813). See also, CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974): "The basis for
these forfeitures was that a breach of the criminal law was an offense to the
King's peace which was felt to justify denial of the right to own property."
16. 4 W. BLACKSTONE at 354. See generally, GOEBEL, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
COLONIAL NEw YORK 711-12 (1944).
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sonalty could be transferred to innocent buyers. In the area of personalty, a sheriff, armed with an arrest warrant issued after indictment, often would seize the goods of the accused even though the
law allowed such seizure of chattels only after conviction. Prior to
conviction, the 'defendant could have access to his property for
maintenance.1 7 The collection of personal forfeitures depended on
administrative action. An excerpt of the jury verdict was forwarded
to the Exchequer where process of collection would issue. Except
in treason cases where the wealth of the offender made forfeiture
profitable, collection was handled very casually.18
In the area of realty, a man charged with treason could have
all his real property interests which he held at the time of the offense forfeited to the Crown. The legal term for this procedure was
"attainder". Attainder was a declaration of a person's
legal death
which ordinarily occurred as a consequence of a sentence to death
for high treason or outlawry.1 9 A man had to be "attainted". Mere
conviction was insufficient because if for some reason such as a
pardon or an error in the indictment, a man was not attainted
after conviction, there could be no forfeiture of his lands."0 Once
attainted, his property was forfeited and his heirs could not inherit
the real property.' Forfeiture of realty was accomplished by a
right of entry without a formal proceeding undertaken by the
sheriff.2"

Common law criminal forfeiture described above was merely
an added penalty imposed in personam against a defendant convicted of a felony. The nature of the property subject to the forfeiture was immaterial. The sanction did not require that the property itself be used in the crime or be otherwise "tainted". The
imposition of forfeiture was automatic upon a finding of guilt, but
the extent of the sanction depended on conviction of the crime.
17. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, at 326. See also, 1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF

THE CROWN 363 (1778); 4 HAWKINS, A TREATISE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN 480

(1795); Fleetwood's Case 8 Coke Rep. 171 (1611).
18. 4 W. BLACKSTONE at 353-54.

19. Outlawry is the offense of flight while accused of an offense; it was
declared in absentia in cases where treason had originally been charged. 4 W.
BLACKSTONE at 353.

20. 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES at 37 (1817).
21. J. CHirTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 724. Later statutes exempted a wife's right of dower and a husband's right of curtesy from the
strictures of forfeiture.
22. A right of entry was the right of taking possession of land by entering on
it in a peaceable manner, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1190 (5th ed. 1979).
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The most severe loss was the forfeiture of real property and "corruption of blood"-whereby a convicted person could not inherit
lands from his ancestors, nor retain those he was already in possession of, nor transmit property to any heir. 23
B. Forfeiture in Early America
In contrast to the English tradition, criminal forfeiture never
enjoyed widespread use in the American colonies. It is suggested
that the colonial governments did not wish to see American property forfeited to the Crown in Great Britain. In addition, most
felons in America were too poor to forfeit anything of value. Imprisonment for felony offenses became widespread in the American
colonies as opposed to the British sanctions of forfeiture and
death. However, after the outbreak of the Revolutionary War,
most American colonies enacted provisions forfeiting the land and
personal property of British loyalists. When American independence had been won, the trend toward forfeiture of property lessened. Concern that innocent heirs would be deprived of their inheritances or the desire to break away from the. English forfeiture
tradition are possible explanations for America's refusal to follow
the English tradition.
Article III, section 3, clause 2 of the United States Constitution reflects some of these concerns and states:
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason, but no Attainter of Treason shall work corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted."
In addition to the constitutional provision, the first Congress
enacted a statutory provision declaring that no conviction shall
work a corruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate." This statutory provision was subsequently contradicted by another statute
even before the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
23. 4 W. BLACKSTONE 381.

24. Once attainted, a person could not act as a witness in court, make a will,
convey property, or bring a legal action. 4 BLACKSTONE at 347. Article I, § 9 of the
U.S. CONST. specifically prohibits Congress from passing bills of attainder. These
provisions apparently provoked little debate among the framers of our Constitution. See 3 J.

STORY, COMMENTARIES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

171-73 (DaCapo ed. 1970).

25. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 117, ch. 9 § 24 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3563).
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Statute 26 was enacted in 1970. The Confiscation Act of 18627 authorized the President to seize the property of those who had
joined the Confederacy in the Civil War. Two Supreme Court decisions upheld the validity of the forfeiture of lifetime interests of
Confederate sympathizers, but recognized the reversionary interests of the offenders' heirs.2
Although there was little experience with criminal forfeiture in
early America, there was an acceptance of civil forfeiture actions
that had been common in the admiralty courts of Great Britain.
The American courts recognized the authority of the federal government to subject ships which were engaged in violations of the
Embargo Acts"s or in piracy to forfeiture in an in rem proceeding
against the "offending" goods. In such an action the owner of the
goods bore the burden of showing why they should not be forfeited
and if the owner did not answer, summary forfeiture ensued.80
Civil forfeiture, however, makes little provision for the rights
of innocent third parties. The action is directed against the res and
when the object (such as a ship, airplane, or automobile) is forfeited to the government, the rights of these third persons are extinguished. However, responsible officials of the government can
decide to remit or mitigate the forfeiture at their discretion.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (1970).
27. Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589, ch. 195 § 5.
28. See Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. 339 (1869) and Miller v. United States, 78

U.S. 168 (1870).

29. In United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 91 (1844), the Supreme
Court upheld the forfeiture of the vessel, saying:
In short, the acts of the master and crew, in cases of this sort, bind the
interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and
he implicitly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs.
30. See generally, Maxeiner, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished
at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768 (1977); Note, Forfeiture of Property Used in
Connection With Criminal Acts, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 83 (1978); Smith, Modern
ForfeitureLaw and Policy: A Proposalfor Reform, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 661
(1978). These articles discuss in rem forfeiture, that is, forfeiture of specific property used in connection with the commission of a crime. Statutes providing for in
rem forfeiture of property related to criminal activity are relatively common. See
Note, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 4 U. MICH. J. OF LAW REF. 546, 624
(1971). In rem forfeiture should be distinguished from in personam forfeiture. In
personam forfeiture punishes a crime with forfeiture of a person's goods and estate generally, rather than the goods used in the commission of a crime. See 37
C.J.S. Forfeitures §§ 1-10 (1943). RICO forfeiture is in personam.
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Constitutional Considerations

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute
(RICO) relies on common law heritage and reintroduces the sanction of criminal forfeiture into American law. As the Senate Report
touching on criminal forfeiture under RICO noted:
While there is some indication that this concept of criminal forfeiture was in usage in the Colonies, the First Congress by Act of
April 20, 1790, abolished forfeiture of estate and corruption of
blood, including in cases of treason. That statute, as revised, is
found in 18 U.S.C. § 3563 ...

From that date to the present,

therefore, no Federal statute has provided for a penalty of forfeiture as a punishment for violation of a criminal statute of the
United States. Section 1963(a), therefore, would repeal 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563 by implication.8 '
If 18 U.S.C. section 3563 has been repealed by implication by the
passage of RICO,8 2 there is no Constitutional problem because
Article III, section 3, clause 2 prohibits forfeiture of all of one's
worldly property and goods, as opposed to RICO forfeitures which
only call for limited forfeiture of the property of a convicted criminal defendant which is related to the conduct of the affairs of a
criminal enterprise.88
Constitutional attacks on the forfeiture provisions of RICO
have focused on claims that the statute is unconstitutionally
vague 4 or that its effect is cruel and unusual punishment.88 These
31. Measures Relating to Crime, Hearings on S. 30, S. 1861 and Related Pro-

posals before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Sen.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 407 (1969). This analysis appears in
a letter from Richard G. Kleindienst, then Deputy Attorney General of the
United States, to the Senate Subcommittee.
32. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1980) hints that the
statute may not have been repealed by implication.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), "any enterprise which he has established, operated,
controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section
1962."
34. See United States v. Grande, supra note 32, (in which an equal protection attack is also rejected); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141 (N.D.
Ga. 1979) (limited forfeiture of property utilized to violate criminal law is not
constitutionally or statutorily barred).
35. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1980) (RICO forfeiture
is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment because punishment is roughly proportional to the magnitude of the defendant's crime). See also United States v.
Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 141 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (RICO forfeiture is not cruel in
that there is no general forfeiture of estate nor unusual in light of other forfeiture
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attacks have been rejected by the courts." The combination of
prosecutorial discretion, trial court supervision of the evidence,
and special jury verdict decision-making should continue to guard
against disproportionate forfeitures. In assessing Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims, courts have emphasized that a mode of punishment adopted by an elected legislature
initially must be presumed valid. 7
Criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. section 1963 will always be
the direct result of the defendant's deliberate violation of extremely serious statutes. It bears the indelibly clear stamp of Congressional intent that such a penalty should be applied, but only
after a criminal trial conducted in full accord with the defendant's
due process rights. It provides for a punishment carefully tailored
in proportion to the offenses to which it is applicable, resorted to
by Congress after lengthy consideration leading to the conclusion
that sanctions previously available to the government to fight
organized crime were limited, and that the widespread growth of
racketeering activity and organized crime so pervaded our economic system that criminal forfeiture was not merely justified, but
was required as an appropriate sanction.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute (RICO)" as Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 197089 in order to fashion an effective new weapon
in the nation's fight against large-scale economic crime and organized crime. After a lengthy examination of the problem, Congress
found that the sanctions and remedies available to the government
under existing laws were "unnecessarily limited in scope and impact."' 0 Recognizing the need for a statute that would hit criminals
provisions in the United States Code).
36.

Id.

37. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976):
[A court] may not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhuman or
disproportionate to the crime involved. And a heavy burden rests on
those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the
people.
See also Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1978).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (1970).
39. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX §901(a), 84 Stat. 941.
40. Id. For discussion of the legislative history of RICO as a whole, see gener-
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squarely in the pocketbook, the lawmakers declared that "an attack must be made upon their source of economic power itself, and
the attack must take place on all available fronts."'
To accomplish this legislative purpose, Congress created a
powerful new criminal forfeiture penalty, broadly applicable to all
types of "property or other interests" and to all persons convicted
of engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity.
The operative forfeiture language in 18 U.S.C. section 1963(a)
states:
Whoever [violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter]
shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired
or maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in,
security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any
kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he
has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated
in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
Section 1963(a)(1) is designed to reach the criminal's "ill-gotten
gains" acquired in violation of the prohibited activities found in
section 1962." Section 1963(a)(2) provides for the forfeiture of any
other property interests in an enterprise and the removal of RICO
ally, Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts, supra, note 1, at 838-45 and
Blakey, Materials on RICO, supra, note 1, 58-106.
41. S. Rzp. No. 92-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).

42. 18 U.S.C. § 1962, Prohibited Activities.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeeing activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has partici-

pated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United

States Code, to use or invest directly or indirectly any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or
the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce ....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c), of this section.
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violators from any source of influence over any enterprise which

has been established, operated or controlled in violation of the
statute. The criminal forfeiture provision of section 1963(a) thus
launches a two-pronged attack upon the economic base of organized crime and white collar crime offenders who engage in a pattern of racketeering activity by mandating both seizure of money
and removal from power upon conviction for a section 1962

violation.

Any analysis of the legislative history of RICO must begin
with the express Congressional command that the RICO statute
"shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. 4' 8
Congress, in this "remedial purposes" clause, assured that strained
and narrow interpretations of the statutory language would not be
read in to defeat its broad intent, which was to authorize the forfeiture of "any interest which has been attained in violation of the
criminal provision."
43. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941. An
interesting argument against the broad reading of the "remedial purposes" clause
is put forward in United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 905 (1st Cir. 1980),
(reversed by the Supreme Court Docket No. 80-808, Decided June 17, 1981)
where the court of appeals asserts that only the RICO civil remedies, not the
criminal sanctions, should be liberally construed. It could be argued that criminal
forfeiture is in most respects "remedial." However, most courts have blurred the
distinction and applied the liberal construction command generally to the criminal provisions of RICO. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 889, 899 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, sub nom., Delph v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States
v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Kaye, 556
F.2d 855, 860 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977); United States v.
Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 416 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978);
United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, sub nom.,
Napoli v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d
430, 439 n.12 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
44. 116 CONG. REC. 35,196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (remarks of Rep. Cellar). It is an ancient and oft-repeated rule of statutory construction that penal
statutes should be strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to

exact statutory penalties. See 3

SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

2

(1974) (hereinafter cited SANDS) (Revision of 3d ed. of SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION). The public policy rationale favoring strict construction of penal
statutes is founded on a balancing of due process interests of the individual
charged with the crime against the interests of society in enforcing the penalty.
Id. at 16. However, it has been recognized repeatedly that strict construction
should not be allowed to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute. See United
States v. Betteridge, 43 F. Supp. 53, 56 (N.D. Ohio 1942).
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes
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Purpose of the Criminal Forfeiture Remedy
The preamble to RICO states:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradicationof organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to
deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime. 6 (Emphasis added).

The Statement of Findings and Purpose also emphasizes the
need for stronger measures in the economic crime field indicating
that:
(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated,
diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions
of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the
illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption ....
(4) organized
crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the
Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce ....
and (5) organized
crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally
admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies
available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope
and impact." (Emphasis added)
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on the legislation
similarly focused on the need to attack the economic base of criminal activity and to make the effect lasting:
What is needed here, the committee believes, are new approaches
that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a semust be construed in a sense which best harmonizes with their intent
and purpose.
See also, Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824-29 (1974) and 3 SANDS at
16-18.
45. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX § 901(a) 84 Stat. 941. It is
now well-settled that the RICO statute is not limited in its application to "organized crime" figures. See United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).

46. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX § 901(a) 84 Stat. 941.
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rious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation."7
B.

CongressionalDynamics

In accordance with the declared Congressional purpose, the
legislative history contains both specific and general signs of the
broad reach of the RICO forfeiture remedy. An important specific
indication was the substantial change made in the language of the
forfeiture provision after the legislation was initially introduced.
The original bill containing this provision was S. 1861. With respect to forfeitures, it provided:
§ 1963. Criminal Penalties
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States all
interest in the enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect interstate or foreign commerce.' 8 (Emphasis added)
After some study of the original bill, Congress added another
forfeiture clause-the present section 1963(a)(1). This subsection
did not confine the remedy to a convicted defendant's interest in
the RICO enterprise, but was drafted in much broader language to
cover "any interest. . . acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962." The clear inference is that this expansion of the scope
of the statutory forfeiture provision was deliberate, reflecting a legislative intention to extend the applicability of the forfeiture
4
remedy. '
Congress' addition of what is now section 1963(a)(1) made the
RICO forfeiture provision broader than the restricted original of
the bill. In addition, the following statement by Senator McClellan
47. Supra, note 41.
48. S. 1861 was introduced by Senators McClellan and Hruska on April 18,
1969. 115 CONG. REc. 9512 (1969). Quoted matter reprinted in Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 61, 67 (1969).

49. This change was not made until after the Department of Justice had spe-

cifically called the original limitation to Congress' attention, by describing the forfeiture provision in the initial bill, S. 1861, as "limited to one's interest in the
enterprise . . . and not extending to any other property of the convicted offender." S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1251. Thus, the Department of
Justice's comment letter was submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee on
August 11, 1969, but the Committee did not begin its mark-up and revision of the
bill until mid-October, 1969. See 115 CONG. REC. 29,638 (1969) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
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in the Senate debate indicates that the statute was to apply to "interests" other than those in the criminal enterprise itself:
The concept of criminal forfeiture is an old one in our common
law. It was extensively used in England and had some limited use
in the Colonies. Title IX, drawing on this early history, would forfeit the ill-gotten gains of criminals where they enter or operate
an organization through a pattern of racketeering activity. 0
Senator McClellan further explained that this remedy was intended both to root racketeers out of the business community and
to take away the fruits of their crimes, stating that:
Mr. President, Title IX is aimed at removing organized crime
from our legitimate organizations. Experience has shown that it is
insufficient to merely remove and imprison individual mob members. Title IX attacks the problem by providing a means of
wholesale removal of organized crime from our organizations, prevention of their return, and, where possible, forfeiture of their illgotten gains5 1 (Emphasis added)

The House of Representatives also believed that the scope of

criminal forfeiture was broad. Thus, the House Judiciary Committee's "Section Analysis" of the legislation stated:
Section 1963 provides criminal penalties-including criminal forfeiture-for violation of section 1962. The maximum penalty authorized under subsection (a) is a $25,000 fine and imprisonment
for 20 years. But, in addition, violations shall be punished by forfeiture to the United States of all property and interests, as
broadly described, which are related to the violations.52 (Emphasis added)
The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee summarized

50. 115 CONG. REC. 591-92 (1969) (remarks of Senator McClellan). See also
116 CONG. REC. 18,939 (1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
51. 116 CONG. Ric. 591 (1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan). Another
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Byrd, described the criminal
forfeiture sanctions in the following terms:
By removing its leaders from positions of ownership, by preventing them
and their associates from regaining control, and by visiting heavy economic sanctions on their predatory business practices this legislation
should prove to be a mighty deterrent to any further expansion of organized crime's economic power. (Emphasis added).
116 CONG. REc. 607 (1970) (remarks of Senator Byrd). Similarly, 116 CONG. REc.
36,296 (1970) (remarks of Senator Dole).
52. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4007, 4033.
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the forfeiture provision as authorizing "forfeiture of any interest
which has been attained in violation of the criminal provision. 5 3
The House floor manager described the penalty provisions:

The maximum penalty provided is a $25,000 fine and imprisonment for 20 years, and there is also provision for criminal forfeiture of the property interests involved in the violations.4 (Emphasis added)
The general concerns which led to the passage of the RICO
statute also indicate that Congress meant the forfeiture remedy to
apply to the monetary proceeds of racketeering activity. The legislative record is replete with references to Congress' determination
to take the profit out of large-scale crime.5 5 Among the crimes that
Congress intended to penalize in this manner were many crimes

whose proceeds almost always consist of money-loansharking,
"bankruptcy bust-outs," insurance fraud, extortion, gambling, and
prostitution.5s

Although there are statements in the legislative history that
indicate that forfeiture applies to a defendant's interest in the
RICO enterprise itselfI 7 there is no statement that precludes the
forfeiture of other types of "interests," including money. Given the

plain language of the statute and the foregoing statements from
the legislative debates, it would strain credulity to conclude that

Congress intended to limit criminal forfeiture to interests in an enterprise by prohibiting forfeitures of other types of interests.
53. 116 CONG. REc. 25,196 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Cellar).
54. 116 CONG. REc. 35,290, 35,295 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff).
55. See, e.g., 115 CONG. Rzc. 5886 (1969) (remarks of Senator Hruska); 116
CONG. REC. 602 (1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan), 819-20 (remarks of Senator Scott), 831 (remarks of Senator Harris), 35,199 (remarks of Rep. St. Germain),
35,309 (remarks of Rep. Mizell), 35,319 (remarks of Rep. Anderson), 35,320 (remarks of Rep. Stratton).
56. See, e.g., 115 CONG. Rsc. 5874, 5885 (1969) (remarks of Senator McClellan); 116 CONG. REC. 585, 587, 593, 586 (1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan);
601 (remarks of Senator Hruska); 606 (remarks of Senator Byrd); 953 (remarks of
Senator Thurmond); 962 (remarks of Senator Murphy); 970 (remarks of Senator
Bible); 18,939 (remarks of Senator McClellan); 35, 199-200 (remarks of Rep. St.
Germain); 35,206 (remarks of Rep. Clancy); 35,300 (remarks of Rep. Schadeberg);
35,327 (remarks of Rep. Rarick).
57. See, e.g., H.R. R"p. No. 91-1549, (91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007.
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III.

RICO CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERESTS SUBJECT TO

FORFEITURE

A. Money Forfeitures
Until the opinion of United States v. Marubeni America
Corp.," it was believed that section 1963(a)(1) clearly provided for
the forfeiture of money as well as other forms of ill-gotten gains. In
Marubeni, two major corporations and several individuals were
charged with wire fraud, mail fraud, interstate travel to commit
bribery, and conspiracy in a scheme to regulate the competitive
bidding for over $8 million worth of telephone cables. The government appealed a ruling by the district court that the criminal forfeiture of "any interests" under section 1963(a)(1) did not include
the $8 million profit on the telephone cable contract. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the defendants that criminal
forfeiture was limited to "an interest in the enterprise" and upheld
the district court's striking the forfeiture paragraph from the indictment. The court of appeals justified its conclusion by reading
statements in the legislative history of RICO concerning the scope
of criminal forfeiture that focused on the phrase "interest in an
enterprise" as being exhaustive of the meaning of the forfeiture
statute, rather than illustrative of one aspect of its application."9
As noted in the legislative history discussed above, RICO forfeiture
is not limited to "interests in" an enterprise, but includes all forms
of ill-gotten gains. Section 1963(a)(1) provides that a defendant
shall forfeit "any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962." The term "any interest" is more than broad
enough to cover pecuniary interests and should obviously extend to
money forfeitures. In interpreting the statutory phrase "any interest," the Marubeni court should have focused on the "remedial
purposes" clause which commands that RICO should be "liberally
58. 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).

59. A district court in the Fifth Circuit has reached the same conclusion as
Marubeniin deciding that Congress did not intend money or ill-gotten gains to be
subject to forfeiture. See United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga.
1979). However, there is another decision presently awaiting appellate review in
that circuit on this issue, see United States v. Holt, No. 78-5260 (5th Cir.). The
Ninth Circuit's restrictive reading in Marubeni, which focuses only on a violation
of § 1962(a) as the means of obtaining ill-gotten gains, rather than any violation
of § 1962, has been criticized as being based on narrow, subjective interpetation
of the legislative history rather than an open-minded reading of the statute itself.

See Note, RICO: Are the Courts Construing the Legislative History Rather Than

the Statute Itself, supra, note 1, 783-89.
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construed to effectuate its remedial purposes"10 and the Statement
of Findings and Purposes1 that reveals Congressional intent to halt
the illegitimate draining of money from our economy, which occurs
through perpetration of economic crimes, by broadening the available sanctions.
Contrary to the holding of the Marubeni court, the words "in
any enterprise" used to limit "interest" in section 1963(a)(2) were
not used in section 1963(a)(1). The statutory phrase, "any interest" in section 1963(a)(1) is, however, limited by the requirement
that the government establish a nexus between the properties it
wishes to seize and a violation of section 1962. It would be illogical
for Congress to prohibit the forfeiture of money simply because a
criminal offender happened to convert a stock ownership or real
property interest into cash. Tracing of the defendant's property
into bank accounts and other places should be permitted so long as
the required nexus to the criminal violation in section 1962 is
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike common law forfeiture,
section 1963(a)(1) forfeiture does not reach all of the defendant's
personal and real property upon his conviction. It is carefully
designed to reach only those interests which are related to the
RICO violation.
Arguably, since Congress did not use the word "profits" in the
RICO forfeiture provisions, as it did in the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,'62 it did not mean to
include pecuniary forfeiture under RICO. Such an argument is not
compelling. The drug abuse statute was not enacted as part of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. It was the product of different hearings, testimony, reports, and debates. More importantly, it
deals with a different substantive evil, narcotics, not economic
crime. Its language must, therefore, be read in this dissimilar
context.
The different subject matter of the drug abuse statute not
only explains the language of its particular forfeiture provision, but
indicates that Congress did intend to authorize pecuniary forfei60. See notes 43 and 44 and accompanying text, supra.

61. See note 46 and accompanying text, supra.

62. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2)(A) (1970). 21 U.S.C. § 848 is known as the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute. Its effective date was October 27, 1970. RICO
was first introduced in the Spring of 1969 and its effective date was October 15,
1970. See, CRIMINAL FORFEITURES UNDER THE RICO AND CONTINUING CRIMINAL
ENTERPRISE STATUTES, (Dept. of Justice, 1980), for a comparison of the two
statutes.
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ture under RICO. The profits from narcotic activity almost always
consist of money and so the "profits" forfeiture clause of that statute 8 refers specifically to money. On the other hand, the profits of
economic crime may take on as many different forms as there are
types of criminal activity." Therefore, Congress built the necessary
flexibility into the RICO forfeiture clause to reach a wide range of
ill-gotten gains through operation of section 1963(a)(1) by providing for the forfeiture of any illegally acquired interests. In short,
the language of section 1963(a)(1) is broader than that of the comparable clause in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 and was intended to have a greater, not a
lesser, reach.
Congress may provide a solution to the Marubeni problem.
Section 2004(a)(3) of the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979, S.

1722, would make all proceeds from a "racketeering syndicate or

enterprise" and all property derived from such proceeds subject to
forfeiture." In addition, section 2004(a)(4) provides that if such
proceeds cannot be located or identified "any other property of the

defendant to the extent of the value of such unlocated or unidentified property shall be forfeited instead." If this provision is enacted or the present statute is amended, there will be absolutely no
doubt as to money forfeitures.
63. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2)(A) (1970).
64. See Subsection B, Property Forfeitures,infra for examples of interests in
addition to money which are derived through economic crime.
65. Section 2004. ORDER OF CRIMINAL FORFEITURE (a) Forfeiture-The
court, in imposing a sentence on a defendant who has been found guilty
of an offense described in section 1801 (Operating a Racketeering Syndicate), 1802 (Racketeering), or 1803 (Washing Racketeering Proceeds),
shall order, in addition to the sentence that is imposed pursuant to the
provisions of section 2001, that the defendant forfeit to the United
States any property(1) constituting his interest in the racketeering syndicate or enterprise
involved;
(2) constituting a means by which he has exerted influence over the racketeering syndicate or enterprise involved;
(3) constituting, or derived from, his proceeds from the racketeering syndicate or enterprise involved; and
(4) if all of the property constituting, or derived from, the interest,
means, or proceeds described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) cannot be
located or identified, any other property of the defendant to the extent
of the value of such unlocated or unidentified property.
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B. Property Forfeitures
Section 1963(a)(2)" contains a list of variables directed toward
the forfeiture of the objects of power other than capital or money.
One part of section 1963(a)(2) relates specifically to any interests
"in" an enterprise." Thus, a personal stock ownership interest in a
corporation or a real property interest in an enterprise, either a
legitimate corporation or an illegitimate group of individuals associated in fact, may be subject to forfeiture under section
1963(a)(2). In addition, a "security of" or "claim against" or "any
contractual right affording a source of influence over any enterprise" may be subject to forfeiture. These types of interests have
included a wide range of matters, including the right to hold union
office. 68
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (1970): Violators shall forfeit
any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right
of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise he has

established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in... in vi-

olation of section 1962.
In United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 143 (N.D. Ga. 1979), the court interpreted the phrase "affording a source of influence over" as modifying only the
immediately antecedent words, "property or contractual right of any kind." Thus,
"any interest in, security of, [or] claim against" the enterprise is forfeitable
whether or not it affords the defendant a source of influence over the enterprise.
The court also stated that the property or contractual rights affording a source of
influence over the enterprise need not be rights in the enterprise. Id. at 144-45.
67. "Enterprise" is broadly defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1970). RICO's
enterprise concept has recently been challenged by a commentator on the grounds
that the "enterprise" concept has supplanted the traditional "wheel" and "chain"
limitations on conspiracy. These limitations require evidence of a connection between the defendants; "enterprise" does not. See Note, Elliott v. United States:
Conspiracy Law and the JudicialPursuit of Organized Crime Through RICO, 65
VA. L. REv. 109, 113 (1979). The Supreme Court will be reviewing the "enterprise" concept in United States v. Turkette, supra, note 11.
68. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1978) on remand, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.
1978). The phrase, "contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence
over" may include the right to hold government office. Certainly the decision in
Rubin, holding that present labor union offices are subject to forfeiture, could
easily be extended to government office holders who have engaged in a pattern of
bribery and corruption. No case has yet attempted such a forfeiture probably because a conviction for a felony offense would usually disqualify the office-holder
from continuing to hold that office.
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In United States v. Huber,6"the defendant's companies, which
were engaged in providing medical supplies and services, were forfeited because of a wide-spread scheme to defraud certain hospitals and insurance companies. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the provision for forfeiture is keyed to the
magnitude of a defendant's criminal enterprise 7 and the punishment under the criminal forfeiture statute did not violate the
eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.7 1 In United States v. McNary,7 ' the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that evidence of indirect investment of the
proceeds of racketeering activity into two legitimate companies
could trigger the forfeiture of the defendant's interests in these
two companies, a window manufacturing company and a travel
agency.
In United States v. Meyers,7 ' the district court focused on forfeiture involving an interest in a bail bond agency. Although the
interest was clearly one under section 1963(a)(2), the court in dicta
commented that it would be a strained construction of the statute
to regard profits or fruits received from an enterprise as being subject to forfeiture.7 4 However, the court did seem to agree that "interest" is akin to a continuing proprietary right in the nature of a
partnership or stock ownership 5 which would obviously be subject
to forfeiture under section 1963(a)(2). Shortly after the district
court opinion in Meyers, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision in United States v. Forsythe.'
A number of other cases have been prosecuted or are awaiting
trial that involve allegations of criminal forfeiture directed at restaurants, an office building, a group of massage parlors, a seafood
processing company, a jukebox distribution company, a record and
tape distributor, stevedoring companies, a taxicab company, a
stamp and coin shop, expensive automobiles, airplanes, and laboratory equipment (mainly involved in narcotic RICO cases), significant parcels of real estate, and several different labor union
positions.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
603 F.2d at 397.
Id. at 396-97.
620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980).
432 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
Id. at 461.
Id.
560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977).
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C. Forfeitable Interests in an Association in Fact
A question may be raised as to what forfeitable interests exist
when the enterprise is defined in the indictment as a group of individuals associated in fact.77 The statute allows such a formulation
and many RICO cases have been successfully prosecuted on this
theory. Narcotics trafficking operations, or a pornography empire,
arson-for-profit rings, and many other "groups of individuals"
cases have been prosecuted and many of them have alleged forfeitable interests under section 1963(a)(1) (money) or section
1963(a)(2) (corporate holdings in real property). There is no barrier to forfeiture in these instances, but there is sometimes nothing
to forfeit.
United States v. Huber" and United States v. Thevis" are
examples of cases in which corporations made up part of the illegal
association-in-fact enterprise. "Person" 80 is defined in the statute
as "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial
interest in property". A corporation, as a legal entity capable of
holding an interest in property, is therefore a "person" and can
violate the substantive RICO provision. In United States v. Marubeni America Corp.,s1 the illegal enterprise consisted of two corporations (Marubeni America Corp. and Hitachi Cable, Ltd.) associated in a joint venture.
A corporation can be a part of the association-in-fact because
it is employed by, associated with or constitutes an illegal entity in
criminal conduct. The Huber court upheld the charging of a group
of corporations as one enterprise as follows:
To view "enterprise" as excluding groups of corporations would
make it too easy to avoid RICO's forfeiture sanction. One could
simply transfer assets from the corporation whose affairs had
been conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity to another corporation whose affairs had up to that point not been so
conducted.

In United States v. Hawes,s3 the enterprise was a group of
individuals who controlled several jukebox supply companies. In
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See note 67 supra, definition of "enterprise".
Supra, note 69.
474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1970).
611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979).
529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
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United States v. Thevis," the enterprise was an association of certain individuals and corporations formed for the purpose of conducting a pornography business through illegal methods, including
murder and arson. The court held that although the enterprise,
that is, the association-in-fact, was incapable of holding property
in its own right, the defendants, including several corporations,
could have forfeitable interests in it. The court stated:
Like an investment in the stock of a corporation ...

a person's

informal contribution of property to an association is an interest
in that association subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. §
1963(a)(2), since the contributed property has been put at the
risk of the association's success. 8"

IV. PROCEDURAL STEPs LEADING TO FORFEITURE
Since 18 U.S.C. section 1963 was a distinct change from in rem
forfeitures" and placed in personam forfeitures into the context of
the criminal case, some thought was given to implementing the
statute. There was some concern over due process requirements. In
1972, a revision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure added
to and clarified the procedures in 18 U.S.C. section 1963 and established a set of steps to be followed in carrying out criminal forfeitures. The rules and procedures will be discussed below.
A.

Giving Specific Notice

Rule 7(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
"No judgment of forfeiture may be entered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent
of the interest or property subject to forfeiture".' 7 Compliance
with Rule 7(c)(2) mandates specificity concerning the interests
84. 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
85. Id. at 143.
86. See note 30, supra.

87. The present version of the rule was the result of a 1979 amendment

designed to clear up the confusion created by a poorly reasoned decision in

United States v. Hall, 521 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975) that applied the rule to forfeiture under a smuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1955). In that case, the court
held that failure to meet the requirements of Rule 7(c)(2) was fatal to the indictment. A subsequent Ninth Circuit case cast doubt upon the validity of Hall even
within that circuit. See United States v. Bolar, 569 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1978). The
1979 amendment made it clear that Rule 7(c)(2) applies to criminal forfeitures
sought under RICO or 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1970) and not in rem forfeitures.
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subject to forfeiture.' If the indictment charges more than one defendant with a RICO violation, there must be a separate forfeiture
paragraph for each defendant specifically alleging his forfeitable
interest. If the specific interest is not determinable, Rule 7(c)(2)
should still be complied with by the best description possible of
the assets the government seeks to forfeit.5 '
88. Criminal forfeiture requires that financial matters be investigated thoroughly prior to return of the indictment in order that the property sought to be
forfeited may be specified clearly. Some techniques used in such a financial investigation are:
(1) The examination of public records including corporate records in the
state of incorporation. If the entity is not incorporated, records of county
offices registering local businesses are examined.
(2) The assistance of the Internal Revenue Service in disclosure of corporate and personal tax returns is sought.
(3) The use of a grand jury subpoena directed at the corporate records of
the RICO target is essential. Corporate records are not subject to a claim
under the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause, although individual records are subject to such privilege. See Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391 (1976). Bank statements, signature cards, cancelled checks, and
credit information are important. These documents give an overall picture of the size, financial history, cash flow, and assets and liabilities of a
business allegedly conducted illegally or in which illegal investments
were made.
(4) The grantee/grantor index should be examined if it is suspected that
large parcels of real estate have been purchased by the targets of the
investigation.
(5) Evidence relative to criminal forfeiture may be discovered by electronic surveillance. In addition, physical surveillance may disclose a person making trips to a business location not previously known. The possibility of the use of a mail cover to yield a daily report of the mail
showing postmark date and addressor (possible victim) may prove
fruitful.
(6) The subpoenaing of telephone toll records is a potential aid. If it is
determined that all or most of the telephone contact of a "front" business is connected to illegal operations, the entire business would be subject to criminal forfeiture.
(7) The development of a cooperating individual is often a good way to
prove a case and also a possible inroad to a view of both money flow and
business transactions. A low-level partner or secretary may fit this bill.
See, Magarity, RICO Investigations: A Case Study, 17 AM. CRIM. L. R.v. 367
(1980).
89. In United States v. Smaldone, 583 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1978), it was held
that alleging the name and address of the restaurant the government sought to
seize was sufficient. See also, United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308 (D.
Del. 1976), in which the court upheld an indictment seeking the forfeiture of "all
profits, interest in, claims against or property or contract and rights" obtained
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A problem may arise in identifying the property subject to forfeiture when it has not remained in its original form throughout
the investigation and subsequent proceedings. The court should order forfeiture of an interest specified in the indictment pursuant to
Rule 7(c)(2) even if the property has changed its form or even has
changed hands. The government is obliged, however, to clearly
trace the property into such new forms. Otherwise questions of excessive variance from the indictment, given the specific mandate of
Rule 7(c)(2), will be raised.
An additional problem involves the characterization of the enterprise and its determination of the scope of the forfeiture permitted by the court. In United States v. Thevis, 90 which involved a
huge pornography empire operating through several corporate entities controlled by Thevis, the government characterized the "enterprise" as "a group of persons associated-in-fact with various corporations to operate a pornography business through unlawful
means". The district court adopted a restrictive view of the scope
of the enterprise based on a literal reading of the indictment. In an
unpublished decision," the court held that the "enterprise" was
not the defendant's pornography business, but rather a conspiracy
formed for the purpose of operating that business "through unlawful means". Based on this reading, the court concluded that only
those business assets that could be directly linked to specific acts
of racketeering (murder, extortion, and arson) were subject to forfeiture. While the Thevis court's interpretation is unlikely to be
followed elsewhere, it is a warning that the formulation of "enterprise" and the specific notice of forfeitable interests may be examined carefully."9
B. Restraining Orders and Performance Bonds
18 U.S.C. section 1963(b) provides:
In any action brought by the United States under this section,
the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take such
from the defendant's participation in a continuing criminal enterprise under 21
U.S.C. § 848 (1970). A "catch-all" forfeiture paragraph under either RICO or
§ 848 will therefore suffice.
90. 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
91. United States v. Thevis, No. 78-180A (N.D. Ga. 1979) (order dated December 10, 1979).
92. See note 67, supra.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

other actions, including, but not limited to, the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any property or
other interest subject to forfeiture under this section, as it shall
deem proper.
The restraining order' s or performance bond 9 4 is an important
step which will guarantee the existence of the interest subject to
forfeiture during the pendency of the criminal case. It should be
stressed that an indictment charging a RICO offense must have
been returned before the government can apply for an order under
section 1963(b).
Although the statutory language is clear, some courts have refused the government's request for restraining orders. In United
States v. Mandel,"5 the court erroneously held that the standards
for preliminary injunctions in civil cases should be considered in
weighing a motion for a restraining order under RICO. The
Mandel court, at a minimum, would require the government to
show: (1) that it had a high probability of success on the merits;
(2) that irreparable harm would occur in the absence of such relief;
(3) that the issuance of such an order would not harm other parties
interested in the proceedings; and (4) that the public interest favored issuing such an order.
The Mandel court did not strike section 1963(b) down on presumption-of-innocence grounds," but left very little room for its
application.
The court is of the opinion that on the facts of this case, the order the government seeks would be incompatible with the presumption of innocence defendants enjoy until such time, if ever,
as a jury finds them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A finding
that the government would be likely to prevail on the merits at
trial ... [is a] determination that defendants are likely to lose at
93. Section 1963(b) may be viewed as a temporary device to prevent postindictment, pre-conviction transfers of property; it is somewhat analogous to the
provision for a temporary restraining order which is an ex parte device, in which
notice and participation in a hearing by affected persons is not required.
94. No cases have been reported in which a performance bond was accepted
in addition to, or in place of, a restraining order. In many instances, a perform-

ance bond would appear to be a practical and effective substitute for a restraining
order. 18 U.S.C. § 3617(d) (1948) explains its operation.
95. 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976) vacated, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979).
96. In United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975), it was
held that the entry of a restraining order did not deprive the defendant of the
presumption of innocence.
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trial.97

The rationale of the Mandel court (which would render the
restraining order provision virtually useless) was rejected in
United States v. Bello.'8 The district court issued a restraining order enjoining the defendant from selling, transferring, or otherwise
disposing of certain assets alleged to be subject to forfeiture. The
defendant claimed that the entry of the order would deprive him
of due process of law in that the order would constitute a pre-trial
determination of guilt. The court analogized a restraining order to
a bail bond and concluded that the entry of the order did not strip
the defendant of the presumption of innocence, saying: "The restraining order does not make a determination that the defendant
is a racketeer, but only freezes those assets to prevent dissipation
pending a determination of guilt or innocence".9" If the government can incarcerate a person prior to trial to insure his appearance, it surely may restrain that individual from alienating property subject to forfeiture in order to insure that the property
remains available to be forfeited. 100
Section 1963(b) gives the court broad authority to take "such

other actions . . . it shall deem proper" in addition to issuing a

restraining order and/or requiring a performance bond. In United
States v. Rubin,"° ' this authority was used to place a labor union
and a district labor council in trusteeship pending the outcome of
the trial.1 02 Such an extreme measure may sometimes be warranted
in the corporate context as well, for example, to prevent the defendant from continuing to use the corporation for criminal purposes
or from bleeding the corporate treasury dry prior to the jury's verdict. Placing a corporation in receivership pending the outcome of
the trial would be analogous to placing a labor union in
trusteeship.
97. 602 F.2d at 682-83.

98. 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979).

99. Id. at 725.

100. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
101. 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
439 U.S. 810 (1978).
102. Rubin ultimately forfeited his offices in the various unions and employee
welfare benefit plans. Although the Rubin decision does not mention the labor
union trusteeship, it does contain a good discussion of the issues surrounding the
forfeiture of Rubin's official positions. While the court upheld the forfeiture, it
ruled that Rubin had the right to seek re-election.
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C.

Special Jury Verdict and Role of the Court

Rule 31(e)'10 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure man-

dates that the jury, or the court as trier of fact in a non-jury case,

shall make a determination of the extent of the interest subject to
forfeiture. In the normal jury case, this is done in the form of a
special verdict.
The return of the special jury verdict creates the actual forfeiture. 1' The decision on criminal forfeiture is appropriately made
by the jury and its decision is analogous to a decision on guilt or
innocence-that is, the jury must be convinced beyond a reasona-

ble doubt of the relationship of the property interest to be forfeited to the RICO violation.105
In United States v. L'Hoste,'06 the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-

peals held that once the jury makes a determination on forfeiture,
the judge shall issue an order forfeiting the property. 10 7 The first
sentence of 18 U.S.C. section 1963(c) states:
Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall
authorize the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited under this section upon such terms and
conditions as the court shall deem proper.

Rule 32(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
When a verdict contains a finding of property subject to a criminal forfeiture, the judgment of criminal forfeiture shall authorize
the Attorney General to seize the interest or property subject to
forfeiture, fixing such terms and conditions as the court shall
103. Rule 31(e), FED. R. CraM. P. states:

If the indictment or the information alleges that an interest or property
is subject to forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent
of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any.

104. The special verdict of forfeiture is submitted to the jury after they have
returned the general verdict. There is little guidance currently as to whether the
trial should be bifurcated by first requiring a jury to decide the issue of guilt on
the RICO offense and then holding another trial to decide the extent of the interest or property subject to criminal forfeiture. In most cases a single trial is
preferable.
105. Proper jury instruction by the court should insure that the decision on
criminal forfeiture made by the jury is based on the facts presented during the
trial of the case. Such jury instructions will include language that suggests that a
jury may find an interest or contractual right forfeitable if there is evidence linking the defendant's conduct to the property interest and the government has
proven such a nexus beyond a reasonable doubt.
106. 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 104 (1980).
107. Id. at 809-13.
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deem proper.
Reading these two provisions together, it is clear that Congress decided that the jury would make a judgment on the relationship of
the property or interest to the criminal violation and that once
made by means of a special jury verdict, the court cannot preempt
the jury's decision.
As the L'Hoste court noted, the discretion given to the district
court by section 1963(c) to determine the "terms and conditions"
of the forfeiture merely encompasses "such administrative details
as the time and place that the property declared forfeited is to be
seized by the Attorney General."'" Even with regard to determining the "terms and conditions" of the forfeitures, however, the district court's discretion is limited by section 1963(c)'s incorporation
of the relevant provisions of the customs laws dealing with forfeitures. As the court noted, under the customs laws, the decision
whether to grant 'a remission or mitigation of a forfeiture is solely
in the hands of Executive Branch officials.
D.

The Special Problem of DisproportionateForfeiture

It may be argued that Congress did not wish to give the government essentially unreviewable power to seek disproportionate
forfeitures and that 18 U.S.C. section 1963(c) should be used to
give district courts discretion to deny forfeitures. This argument
must fail in light of the specific statutory language and the procedural safeguards which include giving specific notice of the defendant's interest, a relationship or nexus to the RICO violation, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and jury determination. Thus, the
sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion will also be tempered by
the safeguards of the statute. However, it is extremely difficult to
set boundaries and to know when forfeiture of an entire business is
proper when only a small amount of the defendant's activities in
connection with that business are illegal. 1'" In some cases a proportionately small, but still significant amount of illegal activity
should trigger forfeiture of the defendant's entire business. In narcotics cases in which legitimate "fronts" are often used the per108. Id. at 811.
109. In United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 n.12
(9th Cir. 1980), the court noted the problem:
For example, a shopkeeper who over many years and with much honest
labor establishes a valuable business could forfeit it all if, in the course of
his business, he is mixed up in a single fraudulent scheme.
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centage basis is irrelevant so long as the narcotics activity seems to
be of a continuing character.1 10 In United States v. Huber,"' the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to lay down any general

rules but cautioned against "undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking
RICO for situations where it was not primarily intended". "
The government may argue that if the criminal activity is serious enough to warrant using the RICO statute in the first place it
is ipso facto serious enough to justify forfeiture of the defendant's
interest in the entire business. The intent of the statute is to re-

move the criminal element from legitimate enterprises and, since

Congress did not contemplate half-way measures in this regard,

there is no reason to attempt to make precise calculations concerning the percentage of business profits attributable to legitimate
activities rather than illegitimate activities.
If specific notice is given as to the defendant's interest, if there
is proof of a relationship or nexus of the property interest to the
affairs of the enterprise1 s and if there are appropriate jury instruc-

tions and a special jury verdict, there should be no danger of dis14
proportionate forfeitures.'

110. United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 933 (1979).
111. 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979).
112. Id. at 396.
113. There is some confusion as to whether the nexus is required to be to the
enterprise or to the acts of racketeering activity. It is suggested here that the
appropriate test is a relationship to the affairs of the enterprise which often in
"association-in-fact" cases is similar to the acts of racketeering. Cf. The inappropriate standard employed in United States v. Thevis:
As there is no evidence in the record from which the court could find
that the success of Global's adult businesses were attributable to the acts
of racketeering or that the adult properties as a group were an interest in
the enterprise, to require the forfeiture of its entire adult business would
constitute cruel and unusual punishment since the penalty would be disproportionate to the crime.
No. CR 78-180A (N.D. Ga. 1979), unpublished order of December 19, 1979).
114. The problem of the rights of innocent third parties does not appear in a
consideration of whether a forfeiture is disproportionate to the defendant, but
only whether the property ought to be forfeited to the government or whether
possession or title ought to be safeguarded for third parties such as creditors,
unindicted and innocent partners, or family members who have a stake in the
property. Some third party problems are considered herein. See notes 122-127
and accompanying text, infra.
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V. DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY ORDERED FORFEITED
The disposition of property ordered forfeited by the court
should normally await an affirmance of the conviction since criminal forfeiture is viewed as part of the sentence. Section 1963(c)
states:
All provisions of law relating to the disposition of property, or the
proceeds from the sale thereof, or the remission or mitigation of
forfeitures for violation of the customs laws, and the compromise
of claims and the award of compensation to informers in respect
of such forfeitures shall apply to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to
have been incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar
as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions hereof.
In drafting the RICO statute, Congress did not specifically address the issue of obtaining control of the property, taking care of
it, settling the rights of third parties, and selling the property.
Congress simply provided that the well-established procedures of
the customs laws should be followed "insofar as applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions" of the RICO statute. The basic
purpose of forfeiture is to remove the defendant from the enterprise and not necessarily to enhance the government treasury. The
major difference between RICO and civil in rem forfeitures under
1
other statutes revolves around the rights of innocent parties.'
Property may be disposed of by sale, retention for public use,
destruction, or donation. The type of property interest involved
and the requirements that disposition take place as soon as "commercially feasible" will affect the choice of method of disposition.
Where property is to be sold, advertisement and notice of sale are
required. Under customs laws, the government receives bids and
sells the property to the highest bidder on a cash basis, with no
guarantees.
A.

The Tracing Problem
In determining the interest to allege, pursuant to Rule 7(c)(2)

115. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1970). "The United States shall dispose of all such
property as soon as commercially feasible, making due provision for the rights of

innocent persons." The Department of Justice has issued regulations, 28 C.F.R.

91, which govern the confiscation and disposal of property used in an illegal gambling business and forfeited under 18 U.S.C. 1955(d) (1970). Section 1955(d) con-

tains much of the same language as § 1963(c). This is not surprising since the
illegal gambling statute originated as Title VIII of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970 and the RICO statute was Title IX of the same Act.
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of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, some tracing or following of property into other forms is necessary. In disposing of property ordered forfeited, the tracing problem sometimes becomes
even more difficult.
Tracing money is a particularly difficult problem as cash is always fungible and sometimes intangible. Rules have been developed to determine the ownership of money which has been commingled in mixed bank accounts and in other situations where the

identity of the money has been lost.11

In many cases the government will be successful only if it can
trace the forfeited property into other forms. The remedies of constructive trusts 17 and equitable liens"' allow for such tracing or
following of property into diverse forms.
B.

Cash in Lieu of Forfeited Property

On several occasions, agreements were reached that permitted
the convicted defendants to substitute cash forfeiture in lieu of the
forfeiture of a specific property interest.1 1 9 In United States v. Huber,12 0 the court permitted the defendant to redeem his interest in
seven corporations, the business of which had been conducted
through a pattern of mail fraud, for the sum of $100,000."I Allowing a convicted defendant to repurchase property which has
been ordered forfeited is often inappropriate and does not comport
116. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, §§ 211-15 (1937).
117. A constructive trust is created "where the person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground he
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to return it." RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 160 (1937). A constructive trust reaches the property itself rather
than its value.
118. An equitable lien is created "where the property of one person can by a
proceeding in equity be reached by another as security for a claim on the ground
that otherwise the former would be unjustly enriched." Id. at § 202.
119. See United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976), where there
was a compromise cash forfeiture of $246,000 in lieu of four vending machine
companies, and United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Wis. 1974), where
there was a compromise cash forfeiture of $10,000 in lieu of an automobile agency.
120. 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979).
121. A similar repurchase method was followed in United States v. Barone,
No. 78-185-CR-WMH (S.D. Fla., October 17, 1979), where the court permitted
the defendants to redeem their interest in a corporation, but reserved ruling on
the amount of the retention payment required. Under the customs laws, specifically 19 U.S.C. § 1614 (1970), cash may be substituted for property ordered forfeited, but this may be an instance where the language of § 1963(c), "insofar as
applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions hereof" might come into play.
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with the goal of breaking up the economic power which has been
utilized by RICO defendants. It flies in the face of what Congress
intended and permits the economic criminal with sufficient resources to regain control of the entity he corrupted, thus turning a
criminal forfeiture into a fine. Only when the government is satisfied that the business is totally bankrupt would a cash settlement
in lieu of forfeiture serve the Congressional purpose of breaking up
criminal enterprises and hitting criminal wrongdoers in the
pocketbook.
C.

The Rights of Innocent Persons

Both section 1963(c)122 and Rule 32(b)(2)1" imply that the
rights of innocent third parties should be safeguarded in forfeiture
proceedings. The term "innocent persons" is not defined by the
statute. Common sense would dictate that innocent persons should
include those who do not have knowledge of the illegal activity, or
who do not voluntarily consent to a relationship to the crime, such
as victimized partners. The classification of someone as "innocent"
or "not innocent" operates not to determine whose property the
government can take, but only whose rights the government must
protect in the disposition of that property.
A difficult legal issue arises when the government seeks forfeiture of property to which a third party holds legal title, but the
government contends that the third party holds the property as
4
the defendant's nominee. In United States v. Mandel,2 the government argued that one of the co-defendants was a secret owner
of certain racetrack stock held in the name of a third person. The
jury agreed, returning a special verdict finding that the defendant
12
owned all the stock and that it was subject to forfeiture. '
Under traditional civil forfeiture proceedings, innocent persons could not assert any claims and were out of pocket if the government forfeited their property. Under the customs laws, Congress desired, as a matter of discretion rather than one of
constitutional dimension, to permit a person with an interest in
the seized property to petition for a cancellation of all or part of
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1970): "making due provision for the rights of innocent persons . . ."
123. Rule 32(b)(2), FED. R. CRIM. P.: "fixing such terms and conditions as the
court shall deem proper."
124. Supra, note 95.
125. 408 F. Supp. at 681.
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the forfeiture.""

Generally, there will be no effect on innocent persons if the
forfeiture paragraph in the indictment12 7 is directed only against
the defendant's interest. The following hypothetical is illustrative.
A RICO defendant owns 20% of the stock of Ajax Corporation
that he has either acquired or used in a complex fraud scheme. In

the RICO indictment against the defendant and in the subsequent
forfeiture action, only the 20% stock interest is sought and ordered
forfeited to the government. The other stockholders would continue to maintain their 80% stockholders' interests.
D.

Remission and Mitigation of Forfeitures

Under the customs laws, customs officials have the discretionary power to remit or mitigate forfeiture."18 Where property is judicially forfeited, as in RICO, the same function is performed by

the Attorney General."'9 Prior to a forfeiture sale, a party may file
a petition for remission or mitigation after notice has been mailed
to him.' 30 Notice may be accomplished by writing to each party of
record indicating that he has an interest in the property declared

forfeited."8 ' In addition to personal written notice, notice should
also be given by publication.' 8 ' For the process of remission or mitigation to operate, it must be found either that the violation occurred without the intent or willful negligence of the petitioner or
that mitigating circumstances exist. 88

Assuming that no petition for remission or mitigation has been
filed, or that these petitions have been disposed of, the property

may be sold at public auction.'" If it appears that the proceeds of
126. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1970).

127. See Rule 7(c)(2), FED. R. CaM. P. and notes 86-114 and accompanying

text, supra.

128. 19 U.S.C. §8 1613 (1978), 1618 (1970).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(10) (1970).
130. 19 C.F.R. § 171.12.
131. The notice should describe the property in detail and advise the party of
his right to apply for relief. It should also advise that failure to apply for relief
within 60 days of notice will result in the disposition of the property.
132. 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1978) and 19 C.F.R. § 162.45(b).
133. The Attorney General reaches a determination on whether mitigating
circumstances exist and this determination is usually not reviewable by a court.
See United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1964) and
United States v. One Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1972). See also discussion of United States v. L'Hoste, text accompanying notes 106-08, supra.
134. 19 U.S.C. § 1609 (1970) and 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.46, 162.50.
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sale will not be sufficient to pay the costs of sale, an order for deor the property may be
struction of the property may be obtained
138
re-manufactured into another article.
Property may also be transferred to the General Services Administration for disposition. It may be screened by that agency to
determine if any other government agency wants the property. 13'
After the expenses of maintenance and sale and the claims of innodecent third parties have been satisfied, the proceeds of sale are
1 7
3
fine.
criminal
a
as
Treasury
States
United
posited with the
A petition for the award of compensation to an informer will
be acted upon by the Attorney General or his designee. This award
to an informer is specifically made a part of RICO. 8'
VI.

CONCLUSION

Similar to the concepts in other portions of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute (RICO), criminal
forfeiture is somewhat complicated and requires rather lengthy explanation. It was aimed at attacking the national problem of organizational crime through the revitalized technique of in personam
forfeiture. A widespread economic attack on the criminal element
that corrupts our system is significantly enhanced by the device of
criminal forfeiture. The provisions of 18 U.S.C. section 1963 offer
some ammunition to break up criminal enterprises and take the
profit out of criminal activity. Combining this process with a full
utilization of the RICO statute in significant and appropriate cases
enables the government to make headway in attacking and eliminating corrupt entities from our society.

135. 19 U.S.C. § 1611 (1930).
136. After a prescribed period, usually 60 to 120 days, if no other agency

claims the property, it is declared surplus and may be disposed of by the General
Services Administration. 40 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1) (1940) (Real Property) and 41

C.F.R. §§ 101-43.402(2), 101-43.402(3) (Personal Property).
137. 19 U.S.C. § 1613 (1978) and 19 C.F.R. § 162.51.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1970), ". . . and the award of compensation to informers in respect to such forfeitures . . ." See also 19 U.S.C. § 1619 (1948).

